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Tochner: Criminal Law: Collateral Sentence Enhancement Based on Prior Unco

CASE COMMENT
CRIMINAL LAW: COLLATERAL SENTENCE
ENHANCEMENT BASED ON PRIOR
UNCOUNSELED CONVICTIONS*
Hlad v. State, 585 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1991)
The trial court convicted petitioner of driving under the influence
(DUI)., Because petitioner had three previous DUI convictions, the
trial court treated his latest offense as a felony. 2 Petitioner appealed,
contending that one of his prior convictions could not be used to enhance the offense to a felony because the conviction had been obtained
while petitioner was without the aid of defense counsel.3 Petitioner
argued that by using a prior uncounseled conviction to support enhancement, the trial court violated petitioner's Sixth Amendment right
to counsel.4 The Fifth District Court of Appeal held that petitioner
had no right to appointed counsel in the prior DUI case, 5 and affirmed
the conviction for felony DUI.6 The Florida Supreme Court granted
review, 7 affirmed the decision of the district court,8 and HELD, a
*Iwould like to dedicate this comment to my parents, Max and Joan Tochner, to my brother,
Paul and to my fianee, Debbi, all of whom have provided me with an infinite amount of guidance
and support. Also, I would like to thank Arthur S. Sachs, who inspired me to pursue a legal
education.
1. Hlad v. State, 585 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1991).
2. Id. The court sentenced petitioner pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 316.193(2)(b) (1987). Id.
The statute provides: "Any person who is convicted of a fourth or subsequent violation of
subsection (1) is guilty of a felony of the third degree...-." FLA. STAT. § 316.193(2)(b) (1987).
3. Hlad v. State, 565 So. 2d 762, 763 (5th DCA 1990), affd, 585 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1991).
4. See id. The Sixth Amendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial ... and to have the Assistance of counsel for his
defence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

5. H/ad, 565 So. 2d at 764. The prior crime was not punishable by more than six months
imprisonment and petitioner was never actually imprisoned for the prior crime. Id. As a result,
the district court reasoned that petitioner had no right to counsel in the prior case and the
conviction was valid. See id. Because the prior conviction was valid, it could be used to enhance
punishment for the later offense. See id. at 767.
6. Id.
7. Hiad, 585 So. 2d at 928. The court claimed jurisdiction under the Florida Constitution,
because H/ad directly conflicted with State v. Troehler, 546 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989)
and Pilla v. State, 477 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985). Hlad, 585 So. 2d at 928. The Florida
Constitution provides: 'The supreme court... [m]ay review any decision of a district court of
appeal... that expressly or directly conflicts with a decision of another district court of appeal.
." FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3).
8. H/ad, 585 So. 2d at 930.
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trial court may use a defendant's prior uncounseled DUI conviction
to enhance that defendant's subsequent conviction, if the state neither
imprisoned, nor could have imprisoned, the defendant for more than
six months for the uncounseled conviction. 9
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is grounded in the belief
that the average defendant does not have the professional legal skill
to adequately protect his life or liberty in a court of law. 10 Because
even the intelligent and educated layman has little skill in the practice
of law, a conviction obtained without counsel is unreliable.,, Therefore,
the United States Supreme Court has held that a state cannot sentence
an indigent defendant to jail or to death unless the state appoints an
attorney to represent the defendant. 12 Because the Court considers
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to be fundamental and essential
to a fair trial,' 3 the Court has applied the Sixth Amendment to the
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend4
ment. 1
Initially, many state courts only appointed counsel for indigent
defendants in felony cases. 5 In Argersinger v. Hamlin, 6 the United
States Supreme Court addressed whether the right to counsel extends
7
to all cases where the state imprisons the defendant upon conviction.'
In Argersinger, the trial court convicted an uncounseled indigent defendant for carrying a concealed weapon. 8 The conviction carried with
it a possible sentence of six months or less, and the trial court sen-

9. Id.
10. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938).
11. See id. at 463.
12. Id. However, an uncounseled defendant may be imprisoned upon conviction if he knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. See id. at 465.
13. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). The Court stated: "[A]ny person haled
into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is
provided for him." Id. The Court also noted that the government hires lawyers to prosecute
and defendants who have money hire lawyers to defend. Id. Therefore, the Court concluded
that lawyers are not luxuries, but rather, necessities. See id.
14. See id. at 341-42. The Fourteenth Amendment provides: "[N]or shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; .... ." U.S. CONsT. amend.
XIV, § 1.
15. See David S. Rudstein, The Collateral Use of Uncounseled Misdemeanor Convictions
after Scott and Baldasar, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 517, 523 (1982). In Gideon, the Supreme Court
first applied the Sixth Amendment Right to counsel to the states. Id. at 518. The Court did
not expressly limit Gideon to felonies. Id. at 522. However, because Gideon actually dealt with
a felony conviction, many state courts only applied Gideon to felony cases. Id. at 523.
16. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
17. See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 27.
18. Id. at 26.
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tenced the defendant to ninety days in jail. 19 The defendant challenged
his conviction, alleging that it violated his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. 2° The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the defendant's conviction.21 The court held that the right to counsel extends only to trials
for non-petty offenses punishable by more than six months imprisonment.2 In reaching this decision, the court followed a line of United
States Supreme Court cases which put a similar limitation on the right
to a jury trial.?
The United States Supreme Court reversed,z holding that a state
could not imprison an uncounseled defendant for either a misdemeanor
or a felony. The opinion distinguished the right to counsel from the
right to a jury trial. 26 The Court noted the historical support for
limiting the trial by jury to serious criminal cases. 27 However, no such
support exists for a similar limitation on the right to counsel.? Thus,
the Court rejected the premise that because some defendants could
be tried without a jury, they could also be tried without a defense
lawyer.?
30
The lower courts differed in their interpretations of Argersinger.
Some courts ruled that Argersingerrequired a state to provide counsel
to an indigent defendant when that state's law authorized imprisonment. 31 Other courts maintained that counsel was only required if a

19. Id.
20. Id. The defendant alleged that because he was denied his right to counsel, he was
unable to properly defend himself. Id.
21. See id. at 26-27.
22. Id.
23. See id. In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), the United States Supreme Court
held that the states were required to grant a trial by jury, pursuant to the Sixth Amendment,
for all but petty offenses. Id. at 157-58. In Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), the Court
defined petty crimes for purposes of right to trial by jury, to be crimes where the possible
penalty exceeds six months. Id. at 73-74.
24. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 27.
25. Id. at 40. The Court advised trial judges to appoint counsel before a trial begins if the
gravity of the offense would warrant imprisonment upon conviction. See id.
26. See id. at 29-31.
27. Id. at 30.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 30-31. The Court also emphasized the special need for counsel in misdemeanor
and petty cases. Id. at 34. Because of the large volume of such cases, the criminal justice system
often seeks a speedy disposition at the expense of fairness. Id. Thus, a defense lawyer is needed
to ensure a fair trial. Id. at 36-37.
30. Rudstein, supra note 15, at 526.
31. Id.
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court actually imposed imprisonment. 32 The United States Supreme
Court resolved this conflict in Scott v. Illinois.In Scott, the trial court convicted the defendant of theft. The
court could have sentenced the defendant to one year in jail, but
instead fined him fifty dollars.3 5 On appeal, the defendant argued that
the state should have provided him with counsel because state law
authorized imprisonment as a penalty 6 The United States Supreme
Court rejected this argument and affirmed the conviction.3 7 The Court
held that the states are only required to provide counsel if a court
actually sentences the defendant to a term of imprisonment.3
Justice Blackmun dissented in Scott.3 9 He argued that the right to
counsel extends at least as far as the right to trial by jury.-° A defendant has a right to trial by jury in all cases where the state-authorized
prison term exceeds six months.41 Therefore, Justice Blackmun would
have extended Argersinger and required the states to supply counsel
for all indigent defendants charged with offenses punishable by more
2
than six months imprisonment.
Shortly after the Scott decision, the Supreme Court addressed the
collateral use of uncounseled convictions in Baldasarv. Illinois.4 The
Supreme Court had long held that an uncounseled conviction obtained
in violation of the Constitution could not be used to enhance the prison
term of a subsequent offense. 4 However, in Baldasar, the Supreme
32. Id.
33. 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
34. Id. at 368.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See id. at 373-74.
38. Id. The Court stated that because incarceration was so severe a sanction, it should
never be imposed unless the defendant had assistance of counsel. Id. at 372-73. However, actual
imprisonment is different from a fine or a mere threat of imprisonment. Id. at 373. To extend
the right to counsel to reach cases in which the defendant is never incarcerated would create
confusion, and impose substantial costs on the states. Id.
39. Id. at 389 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
40. Id. (Blackman, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun wanted to reconcile the Court's jurisprudence regarding the right to a jury trial expressed in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968), and Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970), with the Court's decision regarding the
right to counsel in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). Scott, 440 U.S. at 389-90; (Blackman, J., dissenting); see supra note 23.
41. See Scott, 440 U.S. at 389-90 (Blackman, J., dissenting) (construing Baldwin and Duncan).
42. See id. (Blackman, J., dissenting).
43. 446 U.S. 222 (1980) (per curiam).
44. See Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 114-15 (1967). The Court reasoned that to allow
a conviction obtained in violation of the right to counsel to support increased imprisonment for
a subsequent offense, would be to erode the principle of the right to counsel. Id. at 115. In
effect, the defendant suffers twice from the violation of the same right. Id.
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Court addressed whether a court could 45use a constitutional uncounseled

conviction for enhancement purposes.

In Baldasar,the trial court convicted the defendant of theft and
sentenced him to prison.4 6 During the trial, the prosecutor had introduced evidence of the defendant's prior theft conviction. 47 Because of
the prior conviction, state law enhanced the defendant's subsequent
offense from a misdemeanor to a felony and authorized a longer prison
sentence than state law otherwise allowed.4 The defendant objected
to the trial court's admission of the prior conviction because the defen-49
dant had not been represented by counsel at the first proceeding.
The defendant argued that because the prior conviction was uncounseled, it was too unreliable to support enhancement. 0
The United States Supreme Court reversed the felony conviction
5s However, the Court was split and the Justices could
in Baldasar.
not agree on a rationale for the decision s2 Four concurring Justices
agreed that under Scott, a state may not imprison an indigent defendant unless the court provided counsel for his defense. 3 Therefore,
those Justices maintained that a state may not use an uncounseled
conviction to increase a defendant's prison term for a subsequent offense. 54 Four Justices dissented. They noted that the prior conviction
was valid under Scott because the state had not incarcerated the
defendant for the prior offense ,6 Because the prior conviction was

45.
46.

Baldasar,446 U.S. at 222.
Id. at 223.

47. Id. The defendant had been fined and placed on probation for the prior conviction. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 224.
52. Rudstein, supra note 15, at 529; see Baldasar,446 U.S. at 224-30 (concurring opinions
of Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun).
53. See Baldasar,446 U.S. at 224 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 224-25 (Marshall, J.,
concurring). Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens joined in both Justice Marshall's and Justice

Stewart's concurring opinions. Id. at 224 (Stewart & Marshall, JJ., concurring).
54.

Id. (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 224-26 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall

added that although the prior conviction was valid under Scott, it was not valid for all purposes.
Id. at 226 (Marshall, J., concurring). Specifically, the conviction was not constitutionally valid
for the purpose of depriving petitioner of his liberty. Id. (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice
Marshall concluded that if a conviction is not valid for imposing a prison sentence directly, it

cannot be valid for imposing one collaterally. Id. at 228 (Marshall, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 230 (Powell, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger, Justice White, and Justice
Rehnquist joined in Justice Powell's dissent. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
56. Id. (Powell, J., dissenting).
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valid, the dissenters argued that a state may use the prior conviction
-7
to enhance a subsequent offense. 1,
Justice Blackmun cast the deciding vote. 8 In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun agreed that the Court should reverse the defendant's
subsequent conviction. 59 However., he did not address whether a state
could use a valid uncounseled conviction for enhancement.- Rather,
Justice Blackmun emphasized that the defendant's prior uncounseled
conviction was invalid under the "bright line" approach he had outlined
in his dissent in Scott.61 Because the conviction was invalid, the state
62
could not use it to enhance a subsequent offense.
The instant court used Justice Blackmun's bright line test to determine whether petitioner's prior conviction was valid for the purpose
of enhancement.- The instant cout arrived at its decision by applying
the rationales of the various opinions in Baldasarto the facts of the
instant case.- The instant court then predicted how the Justices of
the United States Supreme Court would vote if the case were before
that tribunal.- The instant court hypothesized that four of the concurring Justices in Baldasar would hold that a court could never use a
prior uncounseled conviction for enhancement.6 However, the four
dissenters would hold that the instant court could use the petitioner's
prior uncounseled conviction for enhancement.67 The instant court
further presumed that Justice Blackmun would cast the deciding vote.-

57. Id. at 231 (Powell, J., dissenting).
58. Rudstein, supra note 15, at 533.
59. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 230 (Blackmun, J., concurring),,
60. See id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
61. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). Under the bright line approach, a defendant must be
granted counsel when he is prosecuted for an offense which authorizes more than six months
imprisonment or whenever he is actually imprisoned. Id. at 229-30 (Blackmun, J., concurring)
(quoting Scott, 440 U.S. at 389-90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). In Baldasar,the defendant was
convicted of an offense which authorized a prison term that exceeded six months. Id. at 230.
Because the defendant was not represented by counsel, his conviction was invalid. Id. (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
62. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
63. Had, 585 So. 2d at 930.
64. See id.
65. See id. However, the composition of the Court has changed since the Baldasardecision.
Rudstein, supra note 15, at 535 n.87. Therefore, predictions on how the Court would decide
the instant case may be inaccurate. See id.
66. Had, 585 So. 2d at 930 (quoting Rudtein, supra note 15, at 534).
67. See id. (quoting Rudstein, supra note 15, at 534). The Baldasardissenters would allow
enhancement because the prior conviction was constitutionally valid under Scott. Id. (quoting
Rudstein, supra note 15, at 534).
68. Id. (quoting Rudstein, supra note 15, at 534).
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The instant court noted that petitioner's prior uncounseled conviction
was valid under the bright line test. 69 Therefore, the instant court
inferred that Justice Blackmun would join the four Baldasardissenters
7
and hold that the state may use the conviction for enhancement. 0
In her dissent, Justice Barkett pointed out that a prior uncounseled
conviction directly increased petitioner's sentence. 71 Justice Barkett
maintained that Argersinger and Scott do not allow an uncounseled
conviction to support imprisonment.72 In Argersinger and Scott, the
Supreme Court concluded that courts often require the appointment
of counsel to ensure the fairness of a trial. 73 Thus, the Court held that
because incarceration is so severe a sanction, a state may not imprison
a defendant unless counsel represented the defendant.74 Justice Barkett reasoned that the instant decision violated Argersingerand Scott
because it allowed an uncounseled conviction to support the enhancement of a subsequent sentence. 75
Furthermore, Justice Barkett opined that the majority had misinterpreted Justice Blackmun's concurrence in Baldasar.76 She noted
that in Baldasar, Justice Blackmun voted to prohibit enhancement
because the prior conviction was invalid under his bright line ap-

proach. 77 However, Justice Barkett maintained that Justice Blackmun

69.
70.

Id.
Id. (quoting Rudstein, supra note 15, at 534-35).

71.

Id. at 931 (Barkett, J., dissenting).

72. Id. (Barkett, J., dissenting).
73. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 36-37; see Scott, U.S. at 372-73.
74. Scott, 440 U.S. at 372-73; Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 36-37.
75. Had, 585 So. 2d at 931 (Barkett, J., dissenting). Although the instant court did not
mention this issue, it was addressed by the Fifth District Court of Appeal. See Hlad v. State,
565 So. 2d 762, 767 (5th DCA 1990), affd, 585 So. 2d 928 (Fla. 1991). The district court noted
that although the uncounseled conviction allowed petitioner's subsequent conviction to be enhanced to a felony, the prison sentence imposed by the trial court would still have been authorized
by statute had the uncounseled conviction not been considered. Id. Petitioner was sentenced to
prison for 364 days, and given five years probation. Id. Absent petitioner's fourth conviction,
the statute would have allowed petitioner to be sentenced to prison for up to one year. FLA.
STAT. § 316.193(2)(a)2.c. (1987). Thus, the district court concluded that the enhancement was
constitutional because it did not result in a greater prison term than would otherwise have been
authorized. Had, 565 So. 2d at 767. However, although petitioner did not actually receive a
sentence in excess of that which would have otherwise been authorized, the instant decision
allows the state to impose enhanced prison terms in such cases. See Had, 585 So. 2d at 930.
Therefore, Justice Barkett's dissent still makes a valid point regarding the precedent which the
instant case established.
76. Had, 585 So. 2d at 931 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
77. Id. (Barkett, J., dissenting).
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never addressed the issue of whether a state could use a valid uncounseled conviction for enhancement. 7s Moreover, Justice Barkett
reasoned that the Florida Supreme Court should not follow Justice
Blackmun's bright line approach because this approach was rejected
by the majority in Scott, and because no other Justice agreed with
this approach when presented in Justice Blackmun's Baldasarconcurrence.

79

Justice Kogan also dissented.?0 He would have reversed the enhanced conviction because he believed it violated the Florida Constitution.81 Justice Kogan noted that the Declaration of Rights in the Florida
Constitution is broader than the Federal Bill of Rights.- Under the
Florida Constitution, Justice Kogan would have held that an indigent
defendant has a right to counsel whenever there is a possibility of
incarceration.- If the state fails to provide counsel, the state may not
imprison the defendant, either directly or collaterally.Notwithstanding the objections of the dissenting Justices, the instant court applied Justice Blackmun's bright line approach to the
instant case.- By following the bright line approach, the instant court
created two distinct right-to-counsel tests in Florida. While courts
must still use the Scott test to determine whether an uncounseled
conviction is constitutionally valid,1 the courts must now use the bright
line approach to decide whether a prior uncounseled conviction may
s7
support collateral enhancement.

78. Id. (Barkett, J., dissenting) (quoting lad, 565 So. 2d at 771 (Coward, J., dissenting)).
79. Id. (Barkett, J., dissenting) (quoting lad,565 So. 2d at 772 (Coward, J., dissenting)).
80. Id. at 932 (Kogan, J., dissenting).
81. Id. (Kogan, J., dissenting).
82. Id. (Kogan, J., dissenting).
83. Id. (Kogan, J., dissenting). Justice Kogan stated: "I would hold that article I, sections
9, 16, and 21 of the Florida Constitution require that the state must afford an indigent defendant
impartial counsel in any case in which there is a possibility of incarceration; .... " Id. (Kogan,
J., dissenting). Article 1, section 9 of the Florida Constitution provides: "No person shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, or be twice put in jeopardy
for the same offense . . . ." FLA. CONST. alt. I, § 9. Section 16 provides: "In all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall . . . have the right . . . to be heard in person, by counsel or
both . . . ." Id. § 16(a). Section 21 provides: "The courts shall be open to every person for
redress of any injury, and justice shall be administered without sale, denial or delay." Id. § 21.
84. Ilad, 585 So. 2d at 932 (Kogan, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 930.
86. See id. at 929.
87. Id. at 929-30. Thus, in order to sentence someone to prison directly, that person must
have been represented by counsel at trial as required by Scott. Id. at 929. However, a prior
uncounseled conviction may still be used collaterally to enhance the prison term of a subsequent
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When the instant court applied the bright line test to the instant
case facts, the instant court only looked at the prior conviction's validity 5 The instant court did not consider whether an uncounseled
conviction could be reliable . 9 A majority of the Baldasar Court espoused this approach.9 In Baldasar, both Justice Blackmun and the
dissenters based their opinions on the validity of the prior conviction.91
The dissenters argued that because the conviction was valid under
Scott, it should also be valid for purposes of enhancement.Y Justice
Blackmun, however, maintained that the conviction was invalid under
the bright line test.9 Therefore, the state could not use the conviction
for collateral enhancement.9 Although Justice Blackmun did not state
explicitly whether a state could use a valid conviction for enhancement,
the bright line test hinged on a conviction's validity, not its reliability. 95
Therefore, the instant court reasonably inferred that because the prior
conviction in the instant case was valid under the bright line test,
Justice Blackmun would allow a state to use the prior conviction for
enhancement.9
Nevertheless, by ignoring the unreliability of uncounseled convictions, the instant decision contradicted the policy behind the right to
counsel.9 7 In the instant case, the court allowed an uncounseled conviction to support the collateral enhancement of a subsequent prison
sentence.9 The United States Supreme Court has held that an uncoun-

offense, if the convict was not originally imprisoned and could not have been imprisoned for
more than six months. Id. at 930.
88. Id.
89. See id.
90. See Baldasar,446 U.S. at 229-30 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that an uncounseled
conviction could not be used to support enhancement because it was invalid under the bright

line approach); id. at 230-35 (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that a constitutionally valid conviction may always be used to support collateral enhancement).
91. See id. at 229-35 (Blackmun, J., concurring- Powell, J., dissenting).
92. See id. at 231 (Powell, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 230 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
94. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
95. See id. (Blaclmun, J., concurring).
96. Rudstein, suprn note 15, at 534. The instant court reasonably inferred the approach
that the Baldasar Court might have taken. Had, 585 So. 2d at 930. However, because the
composition of the Court has changed since Baldasar,the instant decision may not accurately
reflect the approach that would be taken by the Supreme Court today. See supra note 64 and

accompanying text.
97.
98.

See Rudstein, supra note 15, at 535.
See Had, 585 So. 2d at 930.
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seled conviction is not reliable enough to support imprisonment.9 An
uncounseled conviction does not become more reliable because the
state convicted the defendant of a subsequent offense. 1°° Therefore,
the instant court defied policy by using an unreliable conviction to
support imprisonment.10,
In addition to the problem concerning reliability, the instant decision also raises a problem regarding the distinction between the right
to counsel and the right to trial by jury. In Argersinger, the United
States Supreme Court ruled against associating the right to counsel
with the right to trial by jury, noting that the historical foundation
of each right is distinct. 10 2 Justice Blackmun, however, created the
bright line approach precisely because he wished to reconcile the right
to counsel with the right to trial by jury. 10 3 Thus, by adopting Justice

99. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 227 (Marshall, J., concurring); see Scott, 440 U.S. at 372-73;
Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 31-36. An uncounseled conviction is considered unreliable because even
an educated layman has little skill in the practice of law. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,
462-63 (1938). The layman lacks both the skill and knowledge to prepare an adequate defense,
and thus requires the assistance of counsel to ensure a fair trial. See id.; supra text accompanying
notes 10-14. The Court has also emphasized the special need of counsel in petty cases. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 33-34. Because the courts are overwhelmed by the number of petty cases,
a speedy disposition is often sought at the expense of fairness. Id. at 34. Thus, a defense lawyer
is often needed to ensure a fair trial. Id. at 36-37.
100. Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 227-28 (Marshall, J., concurring).
101. See id. at 228 (Marshall, J., concurring).
102. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 30-31; see supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
103. Scott, 440 U.S. at 390 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see supra text accompanying notes
38-41. However, an alternative interpretation of Justice Blackmun's intent can be offered. Under
the bright line approach, an indigent defendant has a right to counsel in any case in which he
is imprisoned, as well as any case in which he has a right to jury trial. Scott, 440 U.S. at 389-90
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). This approach is an expansion of the right to counsel as defined by
the majority in Scott. See id. at 373-74 (limiting the right to counsel to cases in which the
defendant is actually imprisoned). In Scott, Justice Blackmun opined that the right to counsel
should extend at least as far as the right to trial by jury, but did not actually establish an outer
limit. See id. at 389-90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Therefore, one may argue that Justice
Blackmun was not reconciling the right to counsel with the right to jury trial, but rather was
extending the right to counsel to include all cases which warranted a jury trial without indicating
how much further the right to counsel should reach. See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Notwithstanding this argument, the instant court treated the bright line approach as a limit on the
right to counsel, not an extension. See Hlad, 585 So. 2d at 930. By using the bright line approach
as a limit, the instant court attaches the right to counsel to the right to trial by jury in cases
where the defendant was never imprisoned. Sce id. Thus, the instant court not only overlooks
the reasoning in Argersinger, but also may actually undermine the intent behind the bright line
approach. See Scott, 440 U.S. at 389-90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing to extend the right
to counsel at least as far as the right to trial by jury); Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 30-31 (ruling
against associating the right to counsel with the right to trial by jury).
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Blackmun's approach, the instant court overlooked the reasoning behind Argersinger.04
Moreover, the bright line approach carries questionable precedential weightY' 5 Justice Blackmun first advocated the bright line approach in his dissent in Scott.1°6 He concurred in the judgment in
Baldasar and pointed out that if the Court had adopted the bright
line approach, the answer in Baldasarwould have been clear. 0 7 Yet,
by adopting the bright line approach, the instant court treats Justice
Blackmun's dissent and concurrence as if they overruled the rationales
of Argersinger and Scott. °8
Baldasaris a very difficult opinion to interpret because the concurring Justices differed greatly in their reasoning. 0 9 Therefore, the scope
of Baldasar is unclear, particularly in the instant case, where the
prior uncounseled conviction was valid under the bright line approach." 0 Thus, the instant court needed to create a decision which
would provide the lower courts with guidance."' Had the instant court
could
based its decision on the Florida Constitution, the instant court
1 2
have guided the lower courts without addressing Baldasar.
Under the Florida Constitution, the instant court could have held
that Florida courts may never use uncounseled convictions for collateral enhancement."1 This approach would have adhered to the traditional policy underlying Scott and Argersinger, preventing the state
from using unreliable convictions to support imprisonment."1 Because

104. See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 30-31.
105. See lad, 585 So. 2d at 931-32 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (quoting Mad v. State, 565
So. 2d 762, 772 (5th DCA 1990) (Cowart, J., dissenting)).
106. Scott, 440 U.S. at 390 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
107. Baldasar,446 U.S. at 230 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
108. HIad, 585 So. 2d at 931-32 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (quoting lad, 565 So. 2d at 772
(Cowart, J., dissenting)).
109. See Rudstein, supra note 15, at 529.
110. Id.
111. See Had, 585 So. 2d at 928; supranote 7 and accompanying text. The Florida District
Courts of Appeal had conflicting interpretations of Baldasar.Compare Had, 565 So. 2d at 762
(holding that an uncounseled DUI conviction is valid for enhancement purposes when the prior
offense was not punishable by more than six months imprisonment and defendant was not
actually imprisoned for the prior offense) with State v. Troehler, 546 So. 2d 109 (Fla. 4th DCA
1989) (stating that an uncounseled DUI conviction will not support enhancement of a prison
sentence in a subsequent conviction) and Pilla v. State, 477 So. 2d 1088 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985)
(holding that an uncounseled conviction may not be used to enhance a sentence on a subsequent
conviction, unless defendant waived his right to counsel).
112. See Had, 585 So. 2d at 932 (Kogan, J., dissenting).
113. Id. (Kogan, J., dissenting).
114. See id. at 931-32 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
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the approach would have been equivalent to the Scott test, the same
standard would have applied to both direct convictions as well as
collaterally enhanced convictions.115
Although the instant court's interpretation of Baldasaris logical,
it contradicts the policy behind the right to counsel. 116 By allowing an
uncounseled conviction to support enhancement, the instant court
would allow an uncounseled conviction to support imprisonment.117 The
Florida Constitution may be interpreted to prohibit such a limitation
on the right to counsel. 118 However, the instant court did not address
the Florida Constitution. Instead, the instant court created an artificial
distinction in right-to-counsel analysis." 9 The instant case suggests
that the court would still allow Scott to determine the validity of direct
convictions, but would use the bright line test for collateral enhancement cases.12 0 Thus, although the right to counsel remains intact for
direct convictions, that right diminishes when a state collaterally enhances subsequent convictions.
Jeffrey Tochner

115. See Scott, 440 U.S. at 373-74 (holding that a defendant may not be imprisoned unless
he was represented by counsel).
116. See Rudstein, supra note 15, at 534-35; supra notes 87-103 and accompanying text.
117. See Baldasar,446 U.S. at 227-28.
118. See Had, 585 So. 2d at 932 (Kogan, J., dissenting); supra text accompanying notes
81-84.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 85-87.
120. See supra text accompanying notes 85-87.
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